Ligny, 1815 - After Action Report

We are bringing you another AAR from Alex today, this time focusing on the Battle of Ligny. Occasionally I will insert some comments if I feel the need to inject a comment on a certain point, like was done in previous editions.

Optional Rules:

Mostly default options with three adjustments:

Movement Threat Disorder ON – This optional rule adds realism by simulating the morale challenges troops faced when advancing toward the enemy. Historical accounts, such as this description from the Peninsular War, provide an illustrative example of a failed attack due to disorder while being under threat and before contact was even made:

"When we got about a thousand yards from the English line, the men... became anxious... the quick-step became a run... Many soldiers began to fire as they ran..."

The disorder and loss of momentum before contact reflect the psychological strain, which often caused attacks to fail. Movement Threat Disorder optional rule captures this unpredictability—no commander could rely on 100% certainty when advancing on the enemy. This rule also factors in situational awareness, where advancing against stronger enemies was riskier and well modeled by WDS through threat probability. Unit cohesion and experience is also taken into account within this Optional rule, represented by the quality rating within the game, and also impact the chances of success, making this rule a valuable addition for a historically accurate portrayal of battlefield dynamics.

Night Movement Fatigue ON – Napoleonic warfare at night was extremely rare due to the difficulty in command and control. At the battle of Ligny, there was no significant night action in the traditional sense of major combat operations. The main battle took place during the day and ended by late evening. However, after the Prussian forces were defeated and began their retreat, the French forces pursued them into the night, although this pursuit was more of a poorly handled harassing action. To keep the battle settings as realistic as possible, this optional rule is set to ON so the French are unable to carry any major action into the night but can attempt a light pursuit or a march towards exit zones.

No Melee Eliminations ON – This rule is enabled to prevent unrealistic exploits where entire brigades can be eliminated from the battlefield via ZOC (Zone of Control) kills within 15 minutes. The elimination of enemy formations can still be achieved through isolation and routing, but the timing of such outcome will depend on the enemy morale and other morale-impacting factors. When isolated, low quality units usually taken prisoners within 1-2 turns, while elite units can be expected to hold their ground for some time, rather than mysteriously disappearing from the battlefield after a lost melee due to guaranteed chess like combination.

Furthermore, using ZOC kills leads to unnaturally high casualty rates, making battles far more brutal and rapid than historical reality suggests. As Clausewitz observes:

“The resistance that a typical force of 8,000 to 10,000 troops of all arms can offer, even against significantly superior enemy forces and in less than favorable terrain, generally lasts several hours. If the opposing force is only slightly superior or equal in strength, this resistance may extend to half a day.”

(The Principles of War, Clausewitz, Chapter VI. Duration of a battle)

ZOC kills would mostly reduce this period of resistance to significantly less than a few hours, stripping the game of strategic depth and distorting the dynamics of force attrition. Napoleonic engagements typically stretched across hours, depending on the circumstances, and disabling ZOC kills aligns WDS battles more closely with Clausewitz's view of how long formations could sustain pressure, even in less favorable situations.

By contrast, ZOC kills may cause defensive lines to collapse after just a few turns, making it nearly impossible to replicate the resilient defensive actions Clausewitz described. The result is an a-historically brief and disproportionately lethal engagement. Moreover, ZOC kills provide additional incentive for players to favor melee combat over musketry, turning Napoleonic warfare into something it was not: extremely lethal and short-lived confused brawls.

Infantry: The Imperial Guard is the most formidable outfit within the French army and its deployment could be decisive. The III, IV, and VI Corps are composed of smaller battalions, averaging 450-500 men each. This battalion size is not ideal for musket duels, as detaching a skirmish company would reduce battalion strength to around 400 men and below. Therefore, French line infantry should attempt to keep their light companies integrated to maximize firepower within a hex. However, all three corps suffer from a shortage of light troops, with only one light regiment present in each army corps. This shortage is compensated by the presence of three Guards infantry divisions, which can be deployed entirely in skirmish order.

Despite being outnumbered, the French infantry boasts superior quality, including a mix of C, B, and even A-rated regiments within its three army corps. Their morale and combat effectiveness are further enhanced by several replacement leaders embedded within the infantry brigades command structure. Additionally, the presence of approximately 12,500 “A” and above rated Guard infantry provides a significant quality advantage over the Prussians, solidifying the French infantry as a force capable of defeating the numerically superior Prussian infantry.

Cavalry: The French cavalry is a formidable force, comprising three separate cavalry corps totaling around 9,300 troops of very high quality. Both the I and IV Cavalry Corps are composed entirely of A-rated regiments. An additional 6,600 cavalrymen are distributed among the two army corps and the Imperial Guard, bringing the total to approximately 16,500 cavalrymen. This gives the French a significant advantage over the Prussian cavalry:

• 16,500 French cavalry vs. 9,500 Prussian cavalry.
• Approximately ~12,000 of the French cavalry are A-rated, compared to just three A-rated Prussian regiments numbering ~1,750 troopers.
• The French cavalry is organized into eight operational units (divisions or corps level), providing greater flexibility and command efficiency compared to the Prussian cavalry, which is spread across only three cavalry divisions (brigades in Prussian terminology) attached to Prussian army corps.

However, the increased musket FP role in 4.08 version of the game and the *3 cavalry charge modifier featured in the WDS Waterloo title do not allow the French player to rely on frontal charges against an undisordered line of enemy infantry. Also the terrain of the Ligny Battlefield is not ideal for cavalry use so effective handling of the French cavalry will require active maneuvering and identifying open terrain hotspots to fully utilize its cavalry advantage.

Artillery: The French also enjoy a firepower advantage, with 280 cannons compared to 190 for the Prussians. Additionally, around 25% of French batteries are A-rated, offering a +20% firepower modifier. However, the effective number of French guns is somewhat lower, as 14 cannons from I Corps will arrive too late to engage, while 38 cannons from VI Corps are positioned too far in the rear to make a significant impact before visibility is down to 4 hexes at turn 27. So the effective numbers are close to 230 French vs 190 Prussian guns.

Despite being slightly outnumbered and with some reinforcements still on the march to the battlefield, the French army holds clear advantages in organization, light infantry, morale, artillery firepower, and cavalry. The French HQ must incorporate these strengths into their battle plan.

3. Prussian OOB

The Prussian army facing Napoleon at Ligny is made of three army corps:

Each Prussian corps comprises four infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade. Unlike smaller brigades in other armies, each Prussian brigade functions as a divisional-level operational unit, comprising two or three large infantry regiments (brigades in French terms) and 5-7 regiments in cavalry brigades. The infantry brigades often include one or two “D” rated Landwehr regiments, alongside a couple of squadrons of Landwehr or light cavalry and a foot battery of 8 guns. Each regiment typically consists of three battalions, with troop strengths ranging from ~650 to ~800 men. The large battalions of above 650 are not ideal for musket engagements, as some companies will be masked within the hex. To optimize this shortcoming, the Prussian commander may make use of an extended line formation, detaching skirmish companies to achieve an optimal battalion size for muskets use (more information on this tactic can be found in the game’s Manual folder  >  Intro_NapBattles.pdf  >  under "Optimizing Your Infantry Deployment" section on page 30).

Light infantry organization: The Prussian army of 1815 has a unique and arguably superior light infantry organization. Rather than forming light troops into separate light divisions (the Austrian way) or attaching them as brigades/regiments into infantry divisions (the French way), the Prussians incorporated light troops directly into each regiment. Each Prussian non-Landwehr regiment consisted of two battalions of Line infantry and one battalion of typically well-trained light troops called Fusiliers. Prussian Line infantry regiments and most of Landwehr regiments are also able to detach a skirmish company. Thus, Prussian light troops at Ligny were numerous and well-integrated into the organizational structure of the infantry brigades. The example below shows IR 14 deployed as two Line battalions with its detached skirmish companies, and a third battalion being a Fusilier battalion:

The III AK is the weakest in terms of numbers and artillery. It also appears to be the most inferior in terms of quality, with only one A quality infantry regiment, while the remaining 10 regiments are all D quality, mostly composed of Landwehr. A few of its Fusilier battalions are C quality, but these are likely to be deployed in skirmish formation, effectively reducing their morale to D quality. The III Corps cavalry brigade is also the smallest amongst the three Prussian cavalry brigades and has only ~1,800 troopers in its ranks.

4. Prussian Army Initial Deployment

The I Corps is already deployed in a defensive position, but there are significant flaws in its arrangement. The 3rd Infantry Brigade has an exposed left flank, while the weakest 4th Infantry Brigade is positioned without adequate support at Ligny. Additionally, one A-rated Fusilier battalion is badly out of command, separated from the rest of the corps.

The II AK, the strongest of the Prussian corps, is positioned in the second line behind the I AK.  Under Prussian corps structure, the corps commanders have command range of 18 hexes and have to manage five divisional-level leaders [brigades in Prussian terminology].  This may impose significant limitations on the use of the II Prussian Corps positioned in the second line, in case it needs to reinforce multiple sectors. Some brigades of the II Corps operating on one flank might find themselves out of command range, particularly if the French attempt to overextend the Prussian front. In contrast, the French corps commanders typically manage four divisional commanders (3 infantry and 1 cavalry) and have a command range of 24 hexes, which provides much greater operational flexibility.

The III AK is deployed on the Prussian left and has to cover an extended front, including the route to the exit zones in the top-right corner of the map. The D-rated units of the III AK are not well-suited for prolonged defensive actions, making the Prussian left flank the most vulnerable point in the line unless supported by the II Corps. The III AK has only 5 batteries (40 cannons) to cover its wide front and only 3 light battalions, further emphasizing its weakness.

Prussian Player Perspective

The battle of Ligny presents a number of significant challenges for the Prussian commander. Historically the battle was a victory for Napoleon, and as a simulation of the historical events of 16th June 1815 the game naturally forces a series of early decisions that will influence how the battle will be fought. Given the constraints on the Prussian army discussed below, the options for fighting an offensive battle are limited. Taking a defensive posture in the early stages of the battle is prudent. The terrain and the need to defend the Exit hexes drives early decision which are difficult to unwind. The French forces can dictate the pace of battle in choosing their axis of attack. To change history, the Prussian commander needs to find a way to halt Les Bleus and have sufficient strength remaining to mount a counter attack. Easier said than done!

Initial considerations
The Prussian forces have a number of fundamental and significant challenges to consider:

• Initial deployment – Prussian forces are stretched across a wide front and are not in ideal combat positions. The troops on the Prussian right flank are deployed around an objective marker, which leaves them relatively exposed. In the center, around the village of Ligny, units are broken down into skirmisher units and spread through villages. This creates gaps between buildings in the defensive line without a coherent front. On the Prussian left units are more concentrated, however they are in march formation and will need to be deployed relatively quickly.
• Troop quality – The Prussian army is a real mixture of some high-quality infantry (although definitely not enough of this) and cavalry units supported by an effective artillery arm. The challenge is the overall quality rating of the infantry units. There are too many D- and E-rated units which lack the staying power of their French opponents. Consider that this force will be up against not just French Guard units, but well led and good quality infantry and cavalry units who have the ability to concentrate, while the Prussians need to hold a relatively wide front. Deploying units to support their morale is crucial, as is ensuring that leaders are close at hand to maintain order and rally routed units quickly. Plenty to think about.
• Objectives – There are a lot of these, and many are close to the initial French deployments. Players will instinctively want to hold and defend these, an understandable desire. At Ligny, this isn’t so easy. Deploying to defend every objective means that Prussian troops have to develop extended lines of defense, and consider how to connect them to create a coherent line. So the decision isn’t automatically to defend, but rather where to yield an objective and consider how, if possible, to retake objectives later on in the battle. When defending in strength, being stubborn about an objective is a robust strategy, but at Ligny the key word is pragmatism.
• Terrain – Here there is a real advantage for the Prussians, who have a number of choices available. The center of the battlefield is broken up by urban clusters and woodlands, all useful for mounting a defense. In addition, streams and rising ground provide opportunities to break up attacks and—for streams in particular—limit cavalry effectiveness. However, to the right and left there is rolling open terrain that is ideal for quick maneuvers, particularly for cavalry. The choice is to ignore this and focus on a strong defense, or find a way to check or delay strong flanking enemy moves. Roads are also critical. There are number of good quality roads accessible to the Prussian and French. The ability to pivot to meet French attacks will depend on units accessing these roads, so the initial deployments need to consider this.

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It is likely that the Prussian commander will attempt to rectify these weaknesses by moving some elements of the powerful II Corps to the center and left flank, replacing the III AK in the first line, as the latter's D-rated units are unlikely to hold the line effectively.

Having identified the weaknesses in the Prussian OOB and their initial deployment, the French HQ can now proceed with formulating a battle plan.

5. French Battle Plan

The center of the Prussian position is expected to be well defended, with multiple enemy echelons positioned in depth and a narrow front less suited for the powerful French cavalry.

The Prussian right features some flat terrain favorable for the French cavalry north of Wagnelee village. However, concentrating French troops in the area will be time consuming, as there are no roads leading directly to this sector and there is some difficult terrain on the way: hedges, fields, embanks, woods. Given these obstacles for artillery and cavalry, a major attack of the Prussian right was not seriously considered.

The Prussian left flank is identified as the most vulnerable, offering ample space for maneuvering and enveloping the enemy, thus enforcing a battle of maneuver less suited for the Prussian army structure and staff system (command range in game terms). Attacking this flank also threatens the Prussian line of communication, represented by two exit zones in the top-right corner of the map.
Upon assessing the terrain of the Prussian left flank, it is found to be favorable for both skirmish order, where the Imperial Guard is likely to excel, and for cavalry actions, which would favor the superior and numerous French cavalry. Additionally, a rapid concentration of forces in this sector is reasonably achievable, as there is a pike running from the French center-rear to the French right flank.

At the operational level, the French plan resembles a classical maneuver: pin down the enemy's center, draw out its reserves, then strike a decisive blow to one of the flanks. This classical battle plan is also complemented with an attempt to threaten the enemy communication line with a cavalry raid while making a feint on the opposite side:

In fact, at its core, this approach closely mirrors the historical pattern at the actual battle at Ligny. According to Jomini, a similar battle plan secured Napoleon’s victory at Wagram and at Ligny. Napoleon also attempted to execute the same at Borodino, where he achieved only partial success due to the stoic defense of the Russian left flank, the timely arrival of one Baggovut’s infantry corps and pro-active placement of Tuchkov’s corps at Utitza—the flank Napoleon had hoped to outflank with his Vth Corps (Jomini, 1838). At Borodino, Napoleon also used a feint attack against the Russian right flank at the village of Borodino while also being on the receiving end of the Russian cavalry raid on the French left flank.

At the tactical level, the French battle plan aims to engineer a situation where the Imperial Guard will have the upper hand in obstructed terrain, while the French artillery and cavalry will dominate on the open, engaging on their terms and maneuvering into advantageous positions via:

• Extending the Prussian front.
• Threatening the Prussian communication line (exit zones).
• Utilizing obstructed terrain to break down the Imperial Guard infantry entirely into skirmish formations using the advantage of quality and light troops quantity.
• Attempting to exploit the flat terrain northeast of the village of Le Point-du-Jour, which is ideal for the superior French cavalry.

Another terrain feature supporting the plan to attack the Prussian left is the pike running diagonally from the French center to the French right. This axis will allow for rapid concentration of the French forces ordered into this sector. The Imperial Guard Corps positioned in the depth of the French deployment will require 4 turns to position themselves in a marching column on the pike. The Guard divisions begin the scenario out of sight, so they will keep the enemy HQ guessing about the direction they take. The French VI Corps is already partially on this axis, making a straightforward rapid march to the French right via the pike.

However, the Prussians also enjoy the benefit of a pike running behind and parallel to the Prussian army's expected deployment line, making it easier for the Prussians to shift reserves to their left.

The French battle orders as of Turn 1:

Pinning the Prussian Forces: The III, IV Army Corps, and II Cavalry Corps will launch a frontal assault across Ligny and St. Amand on Turn 1, in pursuit of the following:

• Primary objective: forcing the Prussian HQ to commit elements of II Corps into this sector.
• Secondary objective: capturing Ligny and St Amand.

The initial goal is not necessarily to capture the ground but to draw Prussian reserves into the area. The French forces allocated for this attack total around 35,000 troops and 100 cannons, while the Prussian I Corps has only 28,000 troops and 70 cannons. It is assumed that the French numerical and firepower advantage will prevail in this sector, unless the Prussians commit elements of the II Corps which will be badly needed on the Prussian left flank.

Assessing the terrain in this area, it is noted that there are numerous obstructed hexes along the way, while both the IV and the III Corps, as mentioned in the earlier section, face a shortage of light troops for the planned attack. To compensate for this, the Young Guard division is allocated to this sector to support the frontal push in skirmish order. Meanwhile, the 14th Infantry Division of the IV Corps is ordered to advance on the right flank to join the Imperial Guard. The superior command range of the French corps commanders allows these two divisions to be swapped without compromising the chain of command, effectively addressing the tactical challenges posed by the terrain. The 14th Division is equal in size to the Young Guard division, so this swap does not impact headcount allocation.

For the purpose of the AAR going forward, the Young Guard is operationally assigned to the IV Corps, while the 14th Infantry Division has the honor of operating under the command of the Old Guard. However, the French HQ must now pay special attention to ensure that both the Young Guard and the 14th Division remain within the command range of their original corps commanders.

Now, with both the Young Guard and the II Cavalry Corps assigned to this sector, the French force resembles a well-balanced combined arms force, well suited for the frontal push on Ligny and the plains beyond.

Diversionary Attack on the Prussian Right Flank: To help in drawing further enemy reserves, a diversionary attack is planned on the Prussian right flank by the 7th Inf Div of the II Corps. The rest of the corps is busy fighting Wellington’s army at Quatre Bras, so this division has no corps commander—this results in a compromised command and control structure, with a reorganization rate of only 55%. While this is not sufficient for active offensive operations, the division can still draw the attention of the enemy by maneuvering North-East and capturing the village of Wagnelee, worth 50 VPs by Turn 4 . 

This division has two excellent regiments of light troops that can break into skirmish formation and begin pressing the Prussian forces defending St. Amand-La-Haye from Turn 5 onwards. Alternatively on Turn 5, depending on the Prussian moves, the division can proceed north enveloping the Prussian right flank and drawing reserves from the Prussian II Corps.

The light cavalry division of the French III Corps is not much of a help to the III Corps infantry due to the terrain on the way, so it is also allocated to the diversionary attack led by the 7th Inf Div. The cavalry is to deploy on the left flank of the 7th Inf Div, providing combined arms support to this force.

Unleashing the decisive act of the battle: The main attack on the Prussian left flank. Once some of the enemy reserves have been drawn into action at the center, the main assault is to be delivered against the Prussian left flank by the Imperial Guard, with ETA at the village of Tongrinne by Turn 12. This attack is to be supported by the IV Cavalry Corps and the VI Army Corps estimated to arrive in this sector around Turn 14.

Outflanking Raid by I Cavalry Corps: Initially positioned on the far right flank, the I Cavalry Corps is ordered to make an outflanking march towards the Prussian communication line in a Cossack-style raid, inspired by the Russian cavalry maneuver against Napoleon’s left flank at the Battle of Borodino. This maneuver is to be commenced on Turn 1. 

Artillery disposition: Switching to the seat the French Army artillery commander now. The French boast a formidable artillery complement with no shortage of ammunition. However, time is a key constraint—it will take time to deploy the artillery, and by Turn 27 visibility will have dropped to 4 hexes.

In the center, the artillery of the III and IV Corps, comprising 10 batteries (80 cannons), may have around 20 active turns to maneuver, deploy, and engage the Prussian lines. This artillery is already positioned close to the Prussian line.

On the right flank, where the Imperial Guard is expected to attack, it will take approximately 12 turns for the Guard artillery (about 100 cannons) to reach the enemy lines, followed by an additional 2-3 turns for deployment. This leaves only around 12 turns for effective engagement before visibility starts to drop. Considering the possibility that the Prussians might retreat to a secondary defensive line, which would require the French artillery to redeploy, the actual time window for the French artillery to be impactful could be reduced to just 6-9 turns.

To address this timing issue, six foot batteries (48 cannons) from the Imperial Guard are reassigned to the center to bombard the enemy center in preparation for the frontal attack by the III, IV Corps and the II Cavalry Corps. There is plenty of open ground between St. Amand, Ligny and beyond, so it should be easy to find artillery positions for that many cannons. Meanwhile, the Imperial Guard on the right flank will be reinforced by 36 horse guns from all three cavalry corps, as these batteries can reach the front line quicker and faster to reposition in case the Prussians withdraw to a second line.

Planned disposition of the French army by Turn 15:

- Gradually up to 16% of the total army headcount on the left,
- 44% in the center,
- 40% on the right flank.

No plans are made beyond the first 15 turns.

Prussian Player Perspective

Setting a strategy – Having considered all these points, here’s some of my thinking ahead of hostilities breaking out. While WDS games are just that, games, a PBEM player will always have a more enjoyable experience by taking some time to plan your battle. Simply reacting mid-game usually leads to less than optimal outcomes.

The Grand Plan – Sounds grander than it is! Taking the initial considerations into account I opted to fight the battle along the following lines.

Prussian Right and Center

I did not want to fitter away troops defending objective hexes and the towns of Ligny and St. Amand. Packing these locations with skirmishers and attempting to draw the French into costly street fighting could have slowed down the French advance. However, I had concerns about Prussian troop quality being good enough to hold on for an extended period. This would mean yielding a number of Objectives. Balancing the points loss involved against the potential loss and disorder of units defending these locations was a delicate task, but I judged that maintaining unit cohesion was more important for defense. Pulling back also buys time, something that is against the Prussians at Ligny.

Having decided to pull back, I focused on building a strong defense along the ridge lines behind both villages. By concentrating artillery and constructing a Grand Battery, the French would be drawn towards attacking the guns to remove a threat to their flank if advancing to the exit hexes. The defense would depend on the weight of cannon fire, a deep defensive line, and the ability to switch units to concentrate on the point of attack, including cavalry units to counter attack.

This withdrawal also meant planning a counter attack once the heat from the initial French assault had subsided. I decided to withhold some units to launch a counter attack on Ligny and Sombreffe. Aside from the value of taking the Objective in Ligny, such attacks would again threaten the French flank if they were pushing towards the exit hexes to the east.

Prussian Left

Blocking the French advance to the exit hexes presented a stiff challenge. Unlike elsewhere, yielding terrain here was not an option. The combination of streams, rising terrain and villages presented the opportunity to build a defensive line, which supported by guns could delay a French advance. If the French can be held, the planned counter attacks could disrupt their advance and embroil the French in fighting as opposed to advancing.

Maintaining a mobile reserve on the left would be important to rebuild the defensive line at planned fall back positions. It would be unrealistic to expect to hold the French advance, so defense in depth would be the order of the day.

Prussian Cavalry

The same terrain which would aid the Prussian defense made the deployment of cavalry a challenge. Being somewhat concerned about flanking moves on the open terrain both to the left and right, it was important for me to ensure that the expected direct attack was not in fact one or two flanking advances. So cavalry would be dispatched in the early stage of the battle to check/secure both flanks and then be pulled back to support the defense and counter attacks.

6. French Battle Plan Assessment

In martial arts, there is a concept known as “throwing the opponent off-balance.” This involves executing multiple feints from different angles, paired with swift movements and fake attempts, to disrupt the opponent's focus and force them to lose control. When done correctly, the opponent may begin to react frantically, unsure of where or with what force the next strike will land. For this technique to be effective, the feints must appear convincingly real. The mastery lies in using minimal effort to provoke the opponent into expending excessive energy.

Applying this concept to the Napoleonic art of war, as discussed in this article, the French plan includes several key elements designed to throw the Prussian army off balance:

Feint Attack on the French Left Flank: The French plan to commit up to 16% of their army to a feint attack on their left flank, aiming to pull two Prussian brigades into the area. If successful, this maneuver will pull a significant number of Prussian troops away from a more critical sector of the battlefield on the Prussian left.

Should the Prussians allocate only one brigade, it will likely be insufficient, particularly after the arrival of the division from the French I Corps [on map ETA turn 18] and due to the probable lack of cavalry support. In contrast, the French force will be a well-balanced combined arms formation with a strong chance of defeating the Prussian infantry brigade, creating another crisis point along the Prussian line. The French anticipate that by the time the 5,500-strong advance guard of the I Corps reaches Wagnelee village around Turn 25, the Prussians will struggle to maintain a fresh brigade in reserve to support their right flank, leading to its collapse by nightfall and the capture of the 125 VPs Objective at (51,21).

Cavalry Raid on the Enemy's Communication Line: The I Cavalry Corps, numbering around 2,600 troops, is tasked with raiding the Prussian communication line. While the Prussians have the III Corps cavalry positioned in the area, it is only 1,800 strong. Given the superior quality of the French cavalry (rated “A”), a Prussian defeat in a direct confrontation is highly likely. However, streams in the area could present obstacles for the French, as the Prussians may focus on defending key crossings or lay an ambush from the low ground.

Nevertheless, the French advantage lies in their ability to operate at a distance without losing cohesion, supported by superior command and control. The I Cavalry Corps commander has a command range of 24 hexes, while Napoleon’s command range extends to 40 hexes, resulting in a combined 64-hex range that ensures high reorganization rates across the whole French right flank. The Prussians, on the other hand, face operational limitations with their III Corps cavalry, which must operate within 18 hexes of its commander. Dispatching their cavalry to counter the French raid will further weaken the already vulnerable III Prussian Corps, which will then lack sufficient cavalry support.

Attack on the Prussian Center: The French III, IV Army Corps and II Cavalry Corps are tasked with attacking the Prussian center. Although a breakthrough in this heavily defended sector is unlikely, this attack is crucial for drawing significant Prussian reserves away from their left flank, setting the stage for the main assault by the Imperial Guard.

Main Assault on the Prussian Left Flank:  The Prussian left flank was identified as vulnerable, with the weakest Prussian III Corps covering this flank. The enemy front can be easily extended negating the opportunity to deploy in depth and compromising the enemy command and control. The terrain mix favors the superior French cavalry [open ground] and the Imperial Guard [woods and villages]. A successful French attack in this area could threaten the Prussian communication lines, forcing them to react. The plan relies on the superior combat abilities of the French Imperial Guard, which is expected to slice through the Prussian III Corps, composed of  mostly “D” rated units and any Prussians reserves—hopefully not so material— that may have marched into this sector.  The collapse of the Prussian left flank should lead to a major French victory, allowing French units to utilize 8 night turns marching off the map through exit zones and simulating the Prussian army being cut off from its communication lines. Additionally, the French could occupy key objectives on the Prussian left flank, inflict disproportionate losses, and exploit opportunities to bend the enemy front creating enfilade fire zones and opportunities for impactful cavalry charges into flanks.

The French battle plan appears to be robust on paper. The Prussians seem to be out of position and are at a disadvantage in several critical areas, suggesting that the scenario may be heavily balanced in favor of the French. Historically, this may have been the case, and the Prussian commander will need a great deal of stoicism to withstand the French onslaught. However, as we know, it is rare that an original battle plan survives contact with the enemy. At the time of writing this section of the AAR, the first turn is yet to be completed and the scenario has yet to begin in earnest, so it remains to be seen whether this battle plan will succeed.

7. Turns 1 - 6: The Battle Line is Formed

Situation as of Turn 6:

1) French Left: The feint by the 7th Division proceeds as planned, securing Wagnele and the woods in front of St. Amand-La-Haye. The III Corps cavalry is scouting ahead, spotting one infantry brigade (5th??) of the II Corps taking a defensive position covering the Victory Objective on the Prussian far right flank. 

2) Centre – St Amand: The French III Corps cleared St. Amand and St. Amand-la-Haye, with the 3rd Prussian Infantry Brigade staging a tactical retreat under the cover of a light infantry, ~1000 of which were lost in the process mostly as prisoners (via isolation and elimination). The narrow front enabled III Corps to release one (11th) out of three infantry divisions composed entirely of Line battalions to take position on the left of 7th infantry division, effectively replacing it on the far left flank.

3) Center - Ligny: The IV Corps secured Ligny with its two divisions in the first line, defeating the Prussian brigade within the town, routing one Landwehr regiment, and eliminating one Line and one Fusilier battalion through isolation and routing. The Corps was unable to advance any further past Ligny though, as it stumbled into a strong enemy position packed with around 80 guns and lacking suitable positions for its own artillery:

Operationally, the French center achieved its secondary objective of clearing Ligny and St. Amand and shifting future engagement to the open fields north of Ligny, where the French cavalry could threaten the Prussian center.

More importantly, French intelligence estimated that the frontal push into Ligny had drawn two Prussian brigades (believed to be the 7th and 8th) from the II Corps into the area. This suggests that the Prussian III Corps has only one infantry and one cavalry brigade remaining in reserve at the disposal of the Prussian HQ.

The Young Guard, assigned into this sector as per the original disposition, deployed in skirmish formation amongst the III and IV Corps line infantry and helped clear St. Amand and Ligny.

4) French Right: The Prussian III Corps has moved forward, assuming a defensive line along the stream north of Tongrinne village. The Prussians deployed all of the corps' artillery (40 guns) on a high ground behind the stream, focusing on counterbattery fire and knocking out three French guns. The French 14th Infantry Division, assigned to the right flank, was the first to arrive (with the Guard still on the march) and engage the Prussian 10th brigade in the village, and responded with deploying close to 30 guns mostly from horse artillery. Still waiting for Guard artillery to arrive, it concentrated its fire on the Prussian infantry from the 11th brigade:

To the satisfaction of the French HQ, one infantry brigade of the III Corps was spotted moving toward the Prussian center, suggesting that the enemy HQ does not anticipate a significant French attack on its left flank.

To reinforce this perception, one infantry battalion of Old Guard grenadiers was moved towards St. Amand in full view of the enemy, while the main force of Old Guard infantry and the VI Corps are marching towards the French far right, slowing down whenever necessary to avoid being spotted and waiting for the Prussians to be pushed back north of St. Amand to lose Line of Sight (LOS) on the pike in the French rear. This is part of the deception attempt, aiming to keep the Imperial Guard infantry “under wraps” as long as possible:

The French IV Cavalry Corps and Old Guard cavalry demonstratively marched between St. Amand and Ligny within the enemy's line of sight. This show of force in the center of the battlefield also aimed to deceive the Prussian commander into believing that the main attack would come at the center.

Effective from this point, the French IV Cavalry Corps was reassigned to the center, while the II Cavalry Corps, originally ordered into the center, remained near the right flank and was reassigned to support the future attack on the enemy left flank.

5) I Corps Cavalry Raid: The I Corps cavalry is advancing in multiple directions, scouting ahead and eliminating Prussian cavalry pickets on the way.

In summary, no major changes were introduced in the battle plan with the first 6 turns. Apparently, the Prussian commander was not planning to defend Ligny and St. Amand, choosing to give up most of their first line VPs and to deploy on a strong position on a high ground behind Ligny and St. Amand, concentrating in the center but not reinforcing its left flank.

Losses so far: ~1,000 French vs ~3,000 Prussians, most of which were taken prisoner during the Prussian retreat from Ligny and St. Amand. The French accrue +550 VPs, which is 200 VPs short for a Minor Victory.

Prussian Player Perspective, Turns 1-6

The deployment of defensive positions on the right and left flanks went relatively smoothly. As expected, French forces deployed aggressively and advanced to secure objective hexes. Some token fighting has taken place, but defensive positions have been established as planned. French forces have been observed moving east in force and are deployed in strength out of sight of our grand battery on the right. Cavalry sweeps have not identified any significant flanking moves yet, but our scouts have seen significant movement.

8. Turns 7 - 12: The French Battle Plan Unfolds

By Turn 10 all French maneuvers had been spotted by the Prussians, and it is assumed that by then the Prussian HQ was aware of the gravity of the situation on their left. Around this time, two previously unidentified brigades of the II Prussian Corps were spotted moving towards the Prussian left flank.

Overall, the French are satisfied with the progress: as of Turn 12, the Prussian army has been caught off balance, with its left flank heavily outnumbered and barely holding. The Imperial Guard was quick to concentrate and to join the thick of the fighting, while the VI Army Corps is well positioned to outflank the Prussian left or to march towards an exit zone with presumably little opposition. Apart from the aforementioned two brigades, the rest of the Prussian army is already committed elsewhere, either engaged or with limited opportunity to disengage.

At this point, the fog of war was lifted to some degree, revealing the full scope of the French gambit:

1) French Left - Some aggressive maneuvering by the Prussian cavalry brigade of the I Corps, but no direct contact as the French force (one cavalry and one infantry division from the III Corps) retreated and assumed a defensive posture forming squares and deploying artillery. The Prussian cavalry, although strong in numbers, is not supported by infantry or artillery so not perceived as a serious threat. It was forced to retire after a salvo from the heavy French battery. The 2,000 Light Guard cavalry division arrived as off map reinforcements and took position on the far left.

It is estimated that one Prussian infantry brigade and one cavalry brigade are tied up in this sector.

2) Center: North of St. Amand - The 7th Infantry Division, along with one infantry division from the III Corps, made steady progress with skirmishes leading the way. Later, however, they stumbled into a heavily fortified Prussian position, packed with artillery and infantry deployed in line, and faced a counterattack which prevented further advance.

A 24 gun battery was deployed on the right flank of the French III Corps to soften the enemy center.

3) Center: Ligny- The IV Cavalry Corps crossed the stream in force and begun preparing for a mass cavalry charge on the enemy grand battery. A French battery of 48 guns was set up to bombard the Prussian center, gradually wearing them down and preparing the way for a combined arms assault. The IV Army Corps probed with its 14th inf. div. to the right of Ligny , while the 13th inf. div faced the enemy counterattack at Ligny. The Prussian advance was stopped with concentrated skirmish fire from the Yong Guard disordering the Prussian attacking columns:

4) French Right: The 14th Infantry Division was already heavily strained engaging the Prussian 10th and 11th brigades for over 1.5 hours. The Prussian 40-gun battery of the III Corps proved especially effective in counter-battery fire, disabling 15 French guns. However, the French artillery was continuously reinforced with arriving Guard batteries, decimating the Prussian infantry on the other side of the stream.

As the Imperial Guard arrived, the Chasseurs Division was ordered to deploy on the left of the 14th Infantry Division and to melee the enemy skirmish line across the stream. The Guard Grenadiers reinforced the 14th Infantry Division, struggling to secure the village of Tongrinne. Both Guard divisions deployed for battle as if on parade, allocating regimental sectors and proceeding in assaulting the village as well as closing in at the enemy 40 gun battery. The battle-hardened veterans swept everything before them with the bayonet, moving like a raging bull with lowered head. The Old Guard Grenadiers passed through Tongrinne and emerged on the other side of the village:

The Guard's advance was supported by murderous fire from heavy Guard artillery, allowing light horse guns, previously positioned here, to maneuver to the right and to unlimber behind Tongrinne village once it is captured.

The Prussians fought tenaciously and committed their reserves, pushing the guardsmen away from the Prussian battery but being swept by the French canister fire in return. Nevertheless, the Prussians still held on to their position which did not allow for the French to deploy their superior cavalry.

Meanwhile, the 10,000 strong VI Corps began to arrive on following the Imperial Guard. Its three infantry divisions were not particularly disciplined on the march stretching over 30 hexes along the pike. While the Corps was concentrating, the leading 19th inf.div. at the head of the column was ordered to march north-east outflanking Tongrinne village. Going forward this infantry force of ~4,000 strong could be used either to march straight to exit zones or to strike into the flank of the Prussian army.

5) Cavalry raid - French Right: The first objective is considered to be achieved as the Prussian cavalry of the III Corps advanced to face the French cavalry raid, leaving the rest of the heavily engaged Prussian III Corps without much needed cavalry support. The French I Cavalry Corps did not press to engage, instead making an orderly advance while taking care to maintain cohesion, moving in echelons within supporting distance of one another and maintaining continuous ZOC frontage. The corps maneuvered towards the exit zone, attempting to lure the Prussian cavalry further away from their corps commander's effective range of control:

Losses so far:

~2,500 French and 15 guns
vs
~6,300 Prussians and 5 guns

with most of the losses occurring on the Prussian left flan (French: ~1,000 and vs Prussian ~2,000).
The French are owing 600 VPs which is 150 VPs short of Minor Victory.

Prussian Player Perspective turns 7-12

French pressure builds on the Prussian left flank. Prussian infantry stood their ground stolidly and Prussian artillery performed admirably destroying a number of French cannons. While this was a positive result, the plan to delay the French and mount counter attacks still held, it was clear that the Prussian line could not hold indefinitely. Occasional routs could be compensated for, but limited counter attacks were costly in the face of French guns.

On the Prussian right flank and center the clam before the storm, limited fighting continues across the Prussian lines, troops are moved to mount counter attacks. Frustratingly the Prussian cavalry on each flank do not manage to engage any significant French forces. The French fall back on the Prussian right, generating an air punch effect. Time to pull the cavalry back and anticipate the oncoming storm.

9. Turns 13 - 17: The Last Stand

By Turn 13, although long-range (900-1200 meters) but continuous and concentrated fire from the French 48-gun battery was taking its toll on the Prussian center, causing occasional routs and disorder in the Prussian ranks. At this moment, more Prussian infantry was spotted moving away from the center and marching toward the Prussian left, while some artillery batteries in the Prussian center were turned to face St. Amand, supporting the Prussian infantry attacking in the woods north of the village.

The timing was right. Although not yet fully prepared and deployed for the attack, the IV Cavalry Corps seized the moment and charged, leading with a massive stack of cuirassiers in the first echelon, with the rest of the Corps following behind along with three infantry brigades advancing in mixed order formation. This combined arms assault was also supported by artillery, as 24 guns wheeled forward on the left flank of the attack to within canister range, while 16 guns from the 48-gun battery unlimbered and moved closer on the right flank of the attack.

The cuirassiers smashed through the disordered Prussian infantry battalion which neglected to form square and was formed in line, encountering multiple enemy artillery batteries without infantry cover in the second line. Despite a few point-blank canister volleys, the cuirassiers overran 26 enemy cannons and caused further disorder among Prussian infantry. The second cavalry echelon followed, ready to support the charge.

This charge disrupted the firing sectors of the Prussian grand battery creating a gap in the center, with the French advancing in tight formation, supported by artillery on the flanks. The Prussian line held firm.

A second wave of cuirassiers charged on the following turn, penetrating the Prussian line, creating havoc, and overrunning additional batteries. Infantry columns joined the assault, attacking the disordered Prussian squares with bayonets, while artillery pounded the squares with canister fire beforehand. Although the Prussian line began to waver, it still held firm.

Some Prussian reserves were sent into the area, with cavalry being redirected to the sector: a few artillery batteries and some infantry that had initially been moving to reinforce the Prussian left flank were apparently recalled and spotted moving back to the center to plug the gap in the line.

A third wave of cuirassiers from the IV Cavalry Corps struck the enemy center, this time penetrating even deeper, isolating several Prussian battalions and disordering others.

To the left of the French assault, the Prussian counterattack was halted in the woods by infantry from the III Corps, along with a daring cavalry charge that disrupted the Prussian formation and overran an 8-gun battery.

Over the next two turns, half a dozen Prussian battalions in square formation were taken prisoner (via routing or isolation), and almost all Prussian batteries in the area were overrun. On the fifth wave of the French combined arms assault, by Turn 15, the Prussian center collapsed and organized resistance in this sector ceased, despite the late arrival of a few Prussian cavalry regiments that launched a few desperate charges.

Meanwhile, on the Prussian left, the Imperial Guard pressed its assault, pushing the disorganized Prussian III Corps further away from the village of Tongrirre. This allowed the French cavalry, comprising the Imperial Guard and II Cavalry Corps, to cross the stream in force and position themselves for a series of charges. The Prussian infantry attempted to redeploy into a second line, but their ranks were torn apart by the Guard cavalry and French dragoons of the II Cavalry Corps. The Guard cavalry penetrated deep behind Prussian lines, causing chaos, overrunning numerous wagons and artillery. The retreat turned into a rout, with a few Prussian squares making a last stand, attempting to hold their ground but ultimately being surrounded and captured (via routing and isolation), along with a dozen cannons.

The cavalry of the Prussian III Corps attempted to come to their aid but was pursued by the French I Cavalry Corps from the rear and struck in the flank by artillery from the French horse gun deployed to the right of Tongrinne village. A few scattered charges were made, but the cavalry brigade largely disintegrated, having no significant impact on the course of the battle.

Situation as of last turn (17):

1) French Left - With the departure of the Prussian cavalry brigade to the center and the arrival of the Light Guard cavalry division, the French left advanced, threatening the 125 VP objective at hex 51:21. As anticipated in the planning phase, only one Prussian infantry brigade held this sector, with no cavalry support and with only a single artillery battery.

2) Center: North of St Amand and West of Ligny - The French 7th Infantry Division advanced in force, capturing Brye, worth 200 VPs. The Prussian forces in this sector, having been weakened by earlier fighting in the nearby woods, offered little resistance.

3) Ligny - In the final phase of the battle, Prussian infantry attempted a counterattack in dense formations, nearly breaking through the lines of the French IV Corps, which was deployed defensively. However, the French line held, and in the following turn, counterattacked in mixed formation, successfully repelling the Prussian assault.

4) French right - The Prussian left is in full rout. The Guard Cavalry has broken through the Prussian line and is wreaking havoc in the Prussian rear, overrunning numerous wagons.

Prussian Player Perspective turns 13-17

On the Prussian right flank superbly executed French cavalry assaults break the Prussian line behind St Armand, despite heroic fighting and inflicting significant cavalry casualties wave after wave of cavalry overwhelm the defenders, smashing the grand battery. Prussian cavalry arrives to counterattack, but it is too little too late.

On the left pressure causes Prussian morale to crack. The volume of routing units is too great to balance. Reinforcements quickly succumb to the drop in moral. Reconstruction of a defensive line becomes impossible. The Prussian cavalry on the left has become embroiled in a running skirmish with French cavalry.

10. Losses

The battle concluded on Turn 17, with losses typical of Napoleonic engagements:

French: ~7,500 and 16 cannons (10% of the army)
vs
Prussians: ~19,000 and 105 cannons (22% of the army) 

French losses by Corps:

As expected, the IV Cavalry Corps suffered the highest proportional losses while leading the charge on the Prussian center. This formation played a decisive role in securing the French major victory, contributing the most to the outcome of the battle. By Turn 17, it was no longer combat ready with its squadrons scattered, out of command, disordered and partially routed.

The Imperial Guard, by contrast, incurred relatively light losses, which can be attributed to the weakened state of the Prussian III Corps by the time the Guard entered the battle in full force. The Old Guard, leading the attack, maneuvered aggressively, engaging the Prussian infantry in skirmish formation and with bayonet charges into flanks of disordered Prussian infantry. Despite their bold actions, the Old Guard suffered only ~400 casualties out of ~6,400 original headcount across both Old Guard cavalry and infantry. The Young Guard lost 10% of its count (~450) being continuously engaged in heavy fighting around Ligny across 17 Turns , with another ~400 Guard casualties suffered by the Middle Guard.

The Prussian losses by Corps:

As in many historical battles, the majority of Prussian losses occurred after their lines collapsed. It’s estimated that up to a third of these losses were due to Prussian troops being captured as prisoners of war through isolation and routing mechanics. Note that this scenario was played without the ZOC kills (No Melee Elimination optional rule being selected).

The I Prussian Corps suffered the heaviest losses, having been engaged throughout the entire battle. This Corps faced attacks in the center while also taking part in a costly assault in the woods south of Brye. Several thousand troops taken prisoners in the center, after French cavalry penetrated behind Prussian lines, isolating Prussian infantry and leaving them exposed to canister fire and bayonet assault.

The II Prussian Corps saw limited action, primarily involved in skirmishes and a counterattack north of Ligny and a few cavalry charges toward the end of the battle.

11. After Action Analysis

Operational assessment

At the operational level, as Jomini explains in his book The Art of War: “a commander leading 100,000 men divided into eight parts wields significantly more control and flexibility than if those same 100,000 men were divided into only three parts” (Book here, buy the way its only $0.99 for kindle version last time I checked).

In this battle the Prussian army was divided into three parts (Army Corps), while the smaller French army consisted of seven operational-level formations: three Army Corps, the Imperial Guard Corps, and three Cavalry Corps. This is excluding two separate divisions (the 7th Infantry Division and one infantry division of the I Corps, arriving as off-map reinforcements at turn 18).

This factor was successfully exploited by the French battle plan engaging the Prussian army across the entire line, although with varying intensity and timing. The Prussian army had to defend two strategic locations: the victory objectives in the center of the battlefield and its communication line (exit zones) in the top right corner of the map. As a result, the Prussians were forced to make a difficult choice. They could either stretch their forces thin across an extended front to defend both areas, hindering their command and control (being out of command range) and being unable to deploy in depth. Alternatively, they could give up one of these strategic zones, which would most likely result in a major defeat due to victory points loss. This created a critical dilemma for the Prussian commander, especially if the French player played his cards right striking in between the two strategic sectors.

Ultimately, the Prussian HQ opted for a middle-ground approach. They prioritized defending the key victory objectives in the center of the map, giving up some of the VPs to shorten the front, while establishing a strong defensive position around the village of Tongrinne to cover the approaches to the exit zones. Presumably, the plan was to hold off the French forces long enough to prevent them from reaching the exit zones. In my assessment, this could have been successful if the best brigades of the II Corps had been dispatched to the area early in the game. Then, the Prussian left could have attempted a fighting retreat, using a series of delaying actions to trade space for time.

The area around the village of Tongrinne, chosen by the Prussian commander as the defensive position, was surrounded by streams that hindered the French cavalry and high ground that favored Prussian artillery. This position created a natural bottleneck, significantly slowing the French advance toward the exit zones. However, the downside was that the position was closer to the French concentration zone, allowing the Imperial Guard and the VI Army Corps to quickly gather and enter the battle. As a result, both corps spent less time on unproductive marching and more time engaged in combat, bringing the full weight of their firepower to bear on the Prussian left flank. This extended pressure was something the already weak Prussian left flank could not withstand for long, and the position had to be given up after two hours of the engagement (8 Turns).

Despite facing overwhelming odds on the left flank, the Prussian commander fought with gallantry and tenacity, reacting operationally via dispatching reserves and improvising a second defensive line. However, the numerical and tactical superiority of the elite French units eventually proved decisive. The Prussian left flank collapsed with heavy losses, allowing the French enough time to march toward the exit zones.

Overall, the French plan remained relevant and unchanged throughout the entire battle in all key aspects: attack routes, force positioning relative to the terrain, timings of concentration, and the effort required to pin the Prussian reserves in the centre and to crush the Prussian left. The positioning of the French Corps as of Turn 17 were nearly identical to those identified in the planning stage.

Only two minor operational changes were made: the II Cavalry Corps (composed of dragoons) in the center was replaced by the IV Cavalry Corps (cuirassiers), while the II Cavalry Corps was diverted to the right flank. This was the much needed adjustment, as the tactical situation in the center required the elite shock troops to minimize routing and a concentrated shock effort to overrun enemy batteries.

The second adjustment to the initial plan was on the far left, the 7th Infantry Division, which included a significant number of light troops, was replaced by an infantry division from the III Corps, composed of line troops entirely. This division was a better fit for operating in open terrain, while the skirmishers of the 7th Infantry Division found to be more useful in the woods north of St. Amand.

The French battle plan proved successful. By the time the Prussian reserves began moving towards their left flank, the main assault on the Prussian center had begun, creating another crisis of a similar scale and a difficult dilemma for the Prussian high command. As a result, some reserves, particularly the cavalry, spent much of the battle marching without contributing to any of the sectors under attack.

The flow and the outcome of this scenario stresses the importance of having a battle plan before scenario begins. For example, when assuming the role of a divisional commander, it is often very tempting to move units in response to immediate tactical needs, disregarding the overall operational plan - especially when presented with an opportunity for a flanking cavalry charge or an artillery salvo with promising enemy casualties. However, once engaged, it is difficult to disengage. Therefore, having a solid battle plan at the start is crucial, and it cannot be stressed enough that Turn 1 is the most important one in large PBEM battles.

It took me about as much time to develop the battle plan for this PBEM as it did to play through half a dozen turns, analysing the Order of Battle, terrain, Victory Points, and Estimated Times of Arrival before making my first move. This preparation not only increases the chances of success but is also an enjoyable process in itself, especially if everything goes according to plan - in this case you're guaranteed to have one of the most enjoyable games ever. On the other hand, lack of operational planning is likely to result in a number of black holes across the battlefield sucking infinite number of your reserves with you making impulsive decisions made under the pressure of immediate circumstances.

However, having a battle plan does not guarantee that everything will go according to plan. In war, Clausewitz notes, "things do not move forward like a well-oiled machine; on the contrary, the machine itself begins to resist." This is the concept of friction: a combination of execution errors, absurd accidents, and unforeseen circumstances that constantly place the commander in situations very different from those planned.

The friction described by Clausewitz is familiar to many WDS Napoleonic series players who engage in large multiplayer scenarios. Command die rolls will fail, melees will go wrong, ETAs may be missed due to traffic jams, accidental clicks on the map will send batteries to the wrong places and enemy reinforcements will show up in unexpected locations.

War is an arena of uncertainty as Clausewitz writes: “three-quarters of the information on which actions in war are based lies in a fog of the unknown”. Unlike a chess player, a commander cannot see the full disposition of the enemy (and often receives false information about it) and sometimes has only a vague understanding of the position of their own forces. This is the "fog of war," where decisions must be made under time pressure and with limited information. Thankfully, as WDS players, we experience only the enjoyable aspects of Napoleonic warfare. In a turn-based environment, we face no time pressure and begin scenarios with detailed knowledge of enemy positions and troop numbers—at least in scenario mode. Meanwhile, the WDS campaign mode offers much more historically accurate portrayal of the 'fog of war,' allowing us to explore the complexities of command and decision-making—all from the comfort of homes.

Tactical assessment

The unusual aspect of this PBEM battle that the up to half of the Guard infantry was often deployed in skirmish order. Historically, the French were routinely capable of deploying entire units into skirmish order and there are numerous examples of this:

In the Peninsula at the Battle of Busaco a French participant recounts how an entire brigade in Ney's Corps dispersed into skirmish order as they fought along the ridge slopes…

Following the Battle of Salamanca, the French under General Souham engaged in heavy skirmishing with Wellington. At the forefront of the action was Colonel Bachaud who provides a detailed account: "the two left flank companies fired upon the advancing enemy columns...the remainder of the 15th dispersed into skirmish order...after twenty five minutes...the enemy turned our left...and our cloud of skirmishers were forced to retreat".

• The 15th then reformed into two deep line and opened fire. Later in the day the eight companies of the 15th and 66th again broke into skirmish order…
• In 1806, the report of the 16th Legere at Jena describes how, "the third battalion advanced into the woods in skirmish order"
• Throughout the Ratisbon phase of the 1809 campaign, the French made extensive use of massed skirmisher tactics.
• Even in 1813 the French were capable of deploying entire units in skirmish order. The Russian general Langeron recounts how the French left at Lutzen launched its counterattack in skirmish order.
• During the retreat from Leipzig, when the French encountered the Austro-Bavarian army at Hanau, MacDonald placed two battalions of Old Guard Chasseurs in skirmish order, supported them with Old Guard Grenadiers, and attacked”
• In 1814 at La Rothiere, four French battalions were formed in skirmish order by La Giberie to anticipate any attack which might develop in the rear of the wood.
• In 1812 at Borodino, Polish 16th Division fought in the wooded area near the village of Utica having 2/3 (!) of its strength fully in skirmish order.
• In 1813 at Leipzig, Poniatowski deployed 6 Polish battalions into a skirmish line.

While not the most common formation historically and not the most popular formation within the game due to the -1 morale modifier and vulnerability to cavalry, breaking down entire brigades into skirmish order is another option WDS players can select from the tactical toolbox. As this battle demonstrates, this tactic works well with well-trained Light and Guard infantry. Multiple skirmish companies can be stacked in the same hex and can attack through obstructed terrain entirely in skirmish order. "C"-rated or even “B”-rated light infantry regiments can hardly rely on such tactics, as an enemy counterattack or a lucky musket volley is likely to render these troops non-combat ready for hours.

The line infantry was deployed in both line and column formation, resorting to bayonet assaults mostly in obstructed terrain, when the opposing enemy formation was disordered/isolated or when there was an opportunity to flank and exploit gaps in the enemy's line.

Concentrated artillery fire was used by both armies across the PBEM. The French were mostly ignoring artillery targets and focusing their FP on the Prussian infantry – concentrating batteries to fire on sectors where assaults were planned and wheeling guns forward once the assault begun. The Prussian artillery was used in a grand battery manner: one example being the 40-cannons battery on the Prussian flank and the other ~100-gun battery at the center on the high ground behind Ligny and St Amand.

The artillery firepower reduction from version 4.08 had a positive impact on the balance between various arms. This was evident in the center, where the French infantry was able to advance towards multiple Prussian batteries in ordre de mixte. Although such an attack can still be costly with occasional units failing to advance due to disorder, it is no longer suicidal—especially if executed with a continuous front of battalions adjacent to each other, benefiting from the +1 flanking morale modifier.

A key precondition for a successful assault on such positions is the use of combined arms. I had no intention to repeat Ney’s mistake from Waterloo, so the 3,200 cuirassiers from the IV Cavalry Corps, supported by 1,500 cavalry from IV Army Corps, led the assault on the Prussian center, attacking in five waves, alongside the support from three brigades of infantry and close to 80 cannons. The infantry advanced in both columns and lines formations to engage Prussian squares in melee and with musket fire, with line formation also serving the purpose of reducing casualties from enemy auto defensive artillery fire. The attack was further supported by artillery positioned on both flanks, starting with around 60 cannons initially and later increasing to above 80.

On the Prussian side, the backbone of their defense was built around concentrated artillery and dense infantry formations formed in lines. The Prussian cavalry was largely absent throughout the battle. On the French left, there was some aggressive maneuvering by the I Corps cavalry (3,600 strong) on the French left, but this effort was unsupported by infantry or artillery and was easily countered by half a dozen French squares and a few deadly salvos from eight 12-pounder guns. In the center, the first elements of the Prussian cavalry arrived one hour (four turns) after the French assault had already begun and after the Prussian lines had been hit by multiple waves of the French combined-arms assault. It was too little and too late and a few piecemeal charges could not have changed the outcome in the center. On the French right, the entire cavalry of the Prussian III Corps was busy maneuvering against a French cavalry raid, while the infantry and artillery of the III Prussian Corps faced a combined-arms assault from elite French units on their own and lacked cavalry support.

Overall, this PBEM battle confirms the tactical aspects covered in the previous AAR on Quatre Bras. The numerical +9% advantage of the Prussian army (84k vs 76k) was not the decisive factor, as from a tactical and organizational perspective the Prussian army was inferior to the French army in a number of critical aspects: artillery firepower, the number and quality of shock troops represented by “A” rated French heavy cavalry, higher morale ratings across French line infantry, also boosted by numerous replacement leaders , and the presence of the Imperial Guard providing +20% modifier in melee and FP.

Balancing artillery firepower, movement rates and column vs line mechanics is a delicate matter to simulate, but as of version 4.08, this balance, in my view, has been achieved for the 15-minute turn mode. For this reason, I am now fully switching to 15-minute turns, which also provide the added benefits of faster feedback at the operational level, and fewer emails to manage. Thankfully, as of version 4.08, WDS has added a 15-minute turn option for all 10-minute scenarios, including Campaign mode scenarios.

The question remains how the artillery FP balance would play out in battles like Leipzig or Borodino with massive artillery parks. However, there have been hints from WDS that they may be looking into something related to battery ammo resupply at the tactical level - historically a major tactical constraint for artillery commanders of the era but not a limitation for WDS players as of version 4.08, as main ammo supply is applied for each battery with no restrictions in timing, ammo quantity and distances involved.

The standardization of movement rates introduced in version 4.08 is a great improvement in user experience. Now, for 15-min turns, switching between titles no longer requires adjusting to different movement allowances. The new standardized costs also address the long-standing community concern over lack of difference for movement allowance between pike and road movement. This has now been addressed, highlighting the importance of main routes of advance and helping to simulate historical challenges, guiding scenarios along more historically accurate paths.

(RH) In relation to the notes below, Alex and his opponent were given access to a Beta version of the 4.09 update that is currently under development. We have no set release date for this version as of this writing.

4.09 release: Christmas seems to have come early this year, as WDS will be releasing another update for Napoleonic series. The beta version of this update was applied after this PBEM had started, but most of the PBEM heavy fighting has been done using version 4.09.

The key outcome of the update is that skirmishers no longer provide guaranteed protection against infantry in the open and are highly vulnerable to even non-charging cavalry. The implications are significant: the battle flow is now much more fluid and less predictable, as the previously guaranteed "chess-like" combinations of skirmish screens is no longer impenetrable wall for attackers on the open terrain.

In version 4.08, deploying a skirmish screen in front of lines packed with artillery made such positions nearly impossible to assault for formed infantry unless their own skirmishers or artillery were deployed in bigger numbers. However, as demonstrated in this PBEM, this is no longer the case.

Skirmishers in the open can now be pushed back during the movement phase, allowing attackers to make direct contact with the defensive line all within the same turn. However, pushing back skirmishers requires three times the normal movement cost, while also being under fire coming from the skirmishes, so assaults must be carefully planned and coordinated. You will need to account for distances and plan for the movement allowance so the attacking echelon can cover no men’s land (advancing phase), allowing for the pushing of skirmishers and meleeing enemy formed infantry in the same turn (assault phase). Keep in mind, that while such maneuver is possible but likely to be costly as pushing skirmishes will be done under auto defensive fire of the enemy line.

Despite these changes, skirmishers remain a crucial tactical tool and were extensively used in this PBEM. They effectively wore down formed infantry, provided flanking cover to advancing columns, and, on one occasion, Young Guard skirmishers stopped a counterattack by two Prussian regiments, disordering their ranks.

Overall, the 4.09 update is the perfect finishing touch to the balance improvements introduced in 4.08. Once again, my compliments to the WDS team for their thoughtful approach. It's truly remarkable how the game engine has evolved over the years, consistently enhancing the realism and authenticity of Napoleonic warfare simulation.

(RH) This next section is a personal endorsement from Alex. While we at WDS fully support the idea of the various clubs, we withhold "official" endorsement of any one such organization as none of our Staff members are involved in the management of them.

On a related note, I’d like to encourage anyone with a passion for Napoleonic wars to join the Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC): https://www.wargame.ch/wc/nwc/Napann1.htm

Our club, founded in 1998, is the oldest among those dedicated to the WDS Napoleonic series, offering an immersive experience with a unique atmosphere. The heart of our discussions takes place in the famous Rhine Tavern (our forum), where the bar owner, Helga, doesn’t care what color your uniform is, as long as your money is silver or gold. Here, you can trade jokes, swap tactics, or simply moan, groan, or gloat—it's entirely up to you. Additionally, there are two army-specific forums: one for the Coalition Army and one for La Grande Armée, with access restricted to officers of each army. These forums allow officers to hold war councils on their current PBEM games and seek advice from more senior officers.

New cadets, whether joining the French or Coalition army, go through a training game under the guidance of one of our experienced officers, who provides valuable insight into both tactical and operational aspects of the game. Upon completing the training, cadets are commissioned as junior officers, taking command of a regiment and can then challenge other officers to PBEM games using one of the WDS Napoleonic titles. As they gain experience, officers rise through the ranks and may take command of divisions or even corps. Apart from the immersive experience and role-playing, there’s also a practical benefit in joining NWC —it’s always easy to find an opponent who matches your skill level and club members taking pride in their reputation, are unlikely to disappear during your PBEM matches when things move not in their favor.

With the recent improvements to the game engine, there’s never been a better time to get involved. The Coalition Army of the NWC is actively recruiting and just released a new updated webpage for Allied Training College with more materials coming soon: https://www.wargame.ch/wc/nwc/Club_Webpages/Allied_Coalition/War_College/

And that brings us to a close of this latest AAR from Alex. Another nice addition to the Napoleonic Blog content. If you would like to discuss this with other players head on over to the Napoleonic Battles section of the WDS forum to do so.

One last reminder too - Campaign Waterloo is Game of the Week currently - on sale for 25% off now through October 27th.