Ligny and Quatre Bras After Action Report

This AAR is based on the scenario “The Combined Battle of Quatre Bras & Ligny - D'Erlon, Bulow May Fight, June 16, 1815”. This scenario, covering both the Quatre Bras and Ligny battles on the same map, is particularly interesting as it offers both sides a few operational choices. Firstly, there is a French I Corps (19,000 troops) already on the map being fixed with 15% releasing probability, while the Allied side can be theoretically reinforced with Prussian IV Bulow’s Corps (25,000 troops) broken down to multiple elements marching towards Ligny with only 5% probability of arrival. This brings some uncertainty to both sides, and this contingency has to be accounted for by both players. The AAR covers the initial Allied battle plan, an analysis of the actual French moves, and battle progress chapters that cover three phases of the battle, followed by a conclusion analyzing the performance of both sides. This time, I will not be including the analysis of the armies' OOB, as this was covered in detail in the previous AAR on the Ligny battle, so we jump straight into the battle plans section. My standard optional rules and house rules are used, which in my view represent the optimal resemblance of historical Napoleonic warfare without breaking the gameplay or turning it into an arcade massacre (think of ZOC kills), refer to Ligny AAR for further details on this.

Table of contents

1. Introduction

2. Scenario

3. Opposing Battle Plans

4. Turns 1 to 6.

5. Turn 7 to 16.

6. Turn 17-23

7. After Action Analysis

Napoleon has decided to make his main attack against Blucher and his Prussians positioned around Ligny. The Prussians have massed three of their four corps around the village. Bulow's IV Korps is still a march away but may arrive in time.

Napoleon has assembled two corps reinforced with a division for the initial assault on Ligny. He has the Guard and the VI Corps in reserve. Marshal Ney has been detached and given a wing consisting essentially of the II Corps and cavalry to take the vital crossroads at Quatre-Bras. Ney believes he has been promised the I Corps. His opposition at Quatre-Bras does not look numerous, but Ney is mindful of Wellington's preferred tactic of placing most of his army on the reverse slope. Ney is unsure how strong Wellington's force is. Non-participating units are fixed, but may release before the battle's end. Bulow and his IV Korps may arrive on the field. All other units are not fixed.

House rule used:

1. No Positioning of Unlimbered Artillery in Obstructed Terrain (detailed justification for this rule can be found in Ligny AAR).

Victory conditions -

Optional rules used(v 4.09.02):

(red boxes show deviation from the default settings)

2. Opposing Battle Plans

Allied Battle Plan

There is not much planning to be done at this stage, as the initiative is on the French side. The Allied side can only respond to the axis and timing of the French maneuvers. Nevertheless, I did put some basic planning in place to make sure my divisions do not start the battle with chaotic moves responding to the local tactical needs.

Quatre Bras Sector Battle Plan

I attempted to account for two scenarios.

Scenario 1: The Allied army is to face only the II French Corps and the III Cavalry Corps. In this case, the balance of forces would look like:

In this case Wellington’s army is planning to hold the line in the vicinity of QB cross roads. The key is to hold the line along the stream as roughly indicated on the image and by doing so negating the French to deploy their powerful cavalry (~9,000 sabres) on the open. So, bottom line, my plan is to utilise the numerical advantage of the allied infantry, anchoring both flanks on the wooden terrain and holding the centre behind the stream.

Scenario 2: French I Corps is dispatched into this sector:

In this case, the French superiority, not just in cavalry but also in infantry and artillery, would become unbearable to retain Position #1 at QB crossroads for an extended time. Hence, the plan for this development is:

1. To hold Position #1 until it is clear that the French corps is joining Marshal Ney in this sector.

2. To execute a tactical retreat to Position #2, which offers some obstructed terrain protection against French cavalry on the flanks. This is the hardest part. Retreating through open terrain and having a superior cavalry force on my heels is not easy, so some units would be expected to be lost while covering the retreat (refer to my previous AAR on the Jena-Auerstedt battle, which demonstrates the challenges of disengaging and retreating while under attack). The plan is to fight a delaying action on this position, forcing the French to waste time redeploying their artillery. By this time, hopefully, the visibility would drop, leaving the French a limited opportunity window to use their artillery later in the battle.

3. As an emergency provision- to retreat to Position #3 behind the impassible creek, deploying behind the two crossings and covering the exit zone at the edge of the map.

Ligny sector initial battle plan

Again, two scenarios are considered depending on where the French dispatch their I Corps.

Scenario 1: I French corps marches towards QB. IV Prussian Corps fails to arrive (only 5% probability of arrival):

(The balance of forces is also shown on the map: total in absolute and relative numbers) 

In this case, the forces are roughly balanced, with the Prussian infantry advantage being offset by the quality of the French infantry and the qualitative and numerical advantage of the French artillery and cavalry. In this case, an offensive action by the Prussian army would be considered. Tactically, I am planning to deploy Prussian infantry into an extended line and to have more manoeuvrable units, allowing me to build a defence in depth.

Scenario 2: I French Corps marches towards the Prussian right flank at Ligny. The IV Prussian Corps arrives on time (only 5% probability to arrive on schedule) to take part in the action:

In this case, the Prussians would have a significant advantage in infantry.

Scenario 2 is taken as a base one, as I expect the French commander to send his I Corps to Ligny rather than Quatre Bras. The plans are made accordingly:

(arrows indicate counterattacks planned, with the number of arrows indicating the number of brigades to be committed for an initial, limited-scale offensive) 

I Corps objectives

Attack at Ligny with two brigades with the aim of turning the battle into a meat grinder within the town, leveraging our infantry advantage. Objectives:

• Wear the infantry of the French IV Corps
• Draw the French Guard into the fight
• Hold Ligny to threaten and spoil any French advance into the Prussian centre towards the Windmill (hex 112-114)
• Attempt to hold St Amand as a forward position – if St Amand is lost, establish a new line between Ligny and Brye.

III Corps objectives

• Hold the left flank of the Prussian army
• Allocate one infantry brigade to support the defence of Ligny
• If the French do not press the attack, maintain a defensive posture, allocating one more infantry brigade and a few cavalry regiments to support the I Corps.
• If the French attack, deploy for a delaying action, retreating north, and await the arrival of Prussian IV Corps.
• If this sector is identified as a main French attack, elements of II and I Corps are to be redeployed to support the III Corps.

II Corps objectives

• Hold Brye village with one brigade.
• Go on the offensive with three brigades and cavalry to defeat the French III Corps, before the French I Corps arrives. This attack is also designed to draw the French I Corps into this sector away from Quatre Bras. Wellington’s position at Quatre Bras is considered to be very vulnerable, in case both French corps are committed against Wellington. In this case, as mentioned in the previous section, Wellington would be required to disengage and to retreat to Position #2 via open terrain- a kind of maneuver extremely dangerous when facing a superior enemy with superior cavalry. Hence, it is planned to relieve Wellington’s army, forcing the French I Corps to march away from Wellington.

French Battle Plan 

I. Terrain & Tactical Realities

1. Complex ground at both Ligny and Quatre-Bras favours the defender.

• Dense villages, orchards, and hedgerows form natural strongpoints.
• Gentle slopes and scattered streams disrupt cavalry support and hamper rapid deployment.

2. Cavalry corridors are effectively absent. Nowhere along the initial front can French horsemen launch a massed charge without first clearing built-up terrain.

II. Allocation of Effort

The Prussians concentrated at Ligny pose the principal threat. Destroying—or at least ejecting—their army is the Emperor’s foremost objective. Wellington, posted to the north-west, must be contained rather than destroyed; Marshal Ney’s mission at Quatre-Bras therefore shifts from seizing the crossroads to pinning the Anglo-Dutch army, a necessity given II Corps’ modest infantry strength (three divisions).

III. Initial Dispositions & Tasks

1. Vandamme’s III Corps leads the assault:

• 8th, 10th, 11th, and 7th Divisions will storm St-Amand, St-Amand-la-Haye, St-Amand-le-Hameau, and Wagnelée, creating firm jumping-off positions for follow-on forces.

2. Gérard’s IV Corps conducts limited attacks on Ligny, masking its true strength while guarding the flank of VI Corps as it advances onto the central ridge.

3. The Emperor and the Imperial Guard march toward Wagnelée.

• Once there, Mouton’s VI Corps will relieve them in the centre.
• The Guard—supported by its cavalry, Ney’s III Cavalry Corps, and Drouet d’Erlon’s I Corps (if disengaged in time)—will spearhead a breakthrough against the Prussian right once their reserves have been drawn forward.

4. Ney and Reille’s II Corps at Quatre-Bras concentrate on containing Wellington, blocking any attempt by the Anglo-Dutch to unite with the Prussians.

IV. Rationale

• Destroying Blücher first prevents a junction of Allied armies and frees French forces to face Wellington on more favourable terms.
• Attacks at St-Amand and Wagnelée offer the only open ground suitable for Guard artillery and cavalry.
• A controlled, sequential commitment of corps avoids piecemeal losses and preserves striking power for the decisive blow.

Quatre Bras Sector

By turn 4, the French gained a foothold across the stream, isolating Gemioncourt garrisoned with two allied companies. Surprisingly, the French opt to push frontally with no enemy force dispatched to outflank either of the Allied flanks. This makes it easy for the 2nd Dutch Division to maintain a coherent front with most of the units being under command and control. No French cavalry was committed across the stream so the 2nd Dutch could fearlessly deploy numerous skirmishes, causing great damage to the advancing French battalions formed in columns. Eventually, the French deployed three artillery batteries, forcing the 2nd Dutch-Belgian Division to fall back. But by Turn 5, the Brunswick contingent began to arrive, stabilising the line. By the end of the first hour, French losses in this sector were around 1,000 men vs 200 Allied. The attempt to push numerous allied skirmishes deployed on the open with formed battalions, cost french infantry dearly and by turn 5 the french commander stopped the attack, waiting for more of his artillery to deploy.

On the image – situation as of the end of turn 4:

The French are pushing forward over a relatively narrow front

• None of the French cavalry made it across the stream to threaten the allied skirmish line
• Both flanks of the Allied position are secured
• Allied reserves are beginning to arrive and are already at the crossroads

French Operational Options at Quatre Bras: a closer look at possible operational and tactical manoeuvres

Operationally:  

1. The French could have dispatched one infantry division and one cavalry division to outflank the Allied left by marching and crossing the stream near the pond at the hex 54-65. This maneuver would likely have dramatically extended the Allied front by turn 5 or 6, forcing the Allied commander to redeploy the Brunswick contingent to cover the exposed flank.

 2. The French commander could also have sent 6th Division—along with a cavalry division to move through Bossu Woods and threaten the Allied right flank. While this movement would not have gone unnoticed and would have taken time (with an estimated arrival around turn 8), it could have introduced a third major axis of pressure on the allied position. Faced with such a threat, the Allied commander might have been compelled to abandon the crossroads rather than risk being outflanked, with his forces overextended and unable to maintain defence in depth. In this situation, French cavalry might have gained the freedom to operate aggressively, threatening the Allied right and rear and prompting the British 5th Infantry Division to move in response.

Tactically:

3. The French could have moved cavalry across the stream as early as possible to threaten the Allied skirmish line. Even at the cost of disorder, entire regiments might have charged across to engage any reachable Allied companies. The area between Gomincourt and the pond appeared to be the most favourable crossing point, being initially defended only by light Allied infantry. The French 2nd Division’s light cavalry, already close to the Allied lines, was well-positioned to lead this action in the early phase of the battle. At this stage, tactical losses could have been accepted as the cost of achieving a decisive breakthrough—an investment with the prospect of significant returns as Allied units became disorganized and cut off. The goal is to get the cavalry across the stream as soon as possible to avoid the costly alternative of pushing back Allied skirmishes with French formed units. 

4. This cavalry advance could have been followed closely by infantry in column formation, prepared to use bayonets to push the 2nd Dutch Division back as far as possible—ideally before Allied reinforcements began arriving around turn 5 or 6.

5. A supporting attack from skirmishes of the 9th Inf. Div. would also be good to maintain pressure on the allied right flank and keep allied skirmishes disordered via constant melee.

Overall, the French II Corps could have concentrated its tactical pressure on the initially vulnerable Allied left flank. A limited frontal push through the woods, combined with harassing skirmishes, might have kept the 2nd Dutch Division disordered. Once the flanking Maneuver via Bossu (point 2 above) had developed sufficiently, the Allied forces would likely have been compelled to abandon their position around the woods altogether. The key objective for the French in the first hour of the battle is to throw the 2nd Dutch Division off balance, stretch its units thin, and disrupt their chain of command. 

Ligny Sector – Turns 1 to 4

• The French III Corps attacked St. Amand but was repelled by the two Prussian brigades holding this sector. French losses from these actions amounted to 1,000 men, compared to 250 Prussian casualties. Again, as with the Quatre Bras sector, the attempt to overcome allied skirmishes with formed battalions, without disordering them first, was a costly tactic.
• Surprisingly, the French IV Corps did not launch a direct assault on Ligny; instead, it deployed skirmishers and bombarded Prussian positions, inflicting around 150 Prussian casualties.
• Elsewhere, the front lines began to form, with both sides manoeuvring into contact with minor skirmishing. As planned, the Prussian II corps advanced towards Wagnelee village, already occupied by the French 7th division, and began preparations for the assault.
• Bülow’s IV Corps began to arrive: one brigade has arrived on the map (~6,500 men), while the other two have failed to appear so far.

Assessment of the French Battle Plan at Ligny

Based on current intelligence:

• The French Guard has been spotted moving toward the French left.
• No major French assault has materialized at Ligny.

It is therefore assumed that the French intend is:

• Attack the Prussian right flank using elements of the III Corps, the 7th Inf. Division of the II Corps, and the Imperial Guard
• Launch a supporting attack at Tongrinne (it appeared later I was wrong about this one)
• Make a frontal push at Quatre Bras using the II Corps only, supported by the III Cavalry Corps.
• I French Corps is assumed to be marching to support the main French Attack on the Prussian right flank.

Assessing the French plan operationally, it appears that the key flaw in the French plan is that it makes it extremely difficult to exploit their cavalry advantage. About 11,000 French horsemen are parked on the French right flank facing the III Prussian corps, which is deployed defensively behind broken ground. These positions must be cleared by the French Infantry before the cavalry can move in and deploy for battle. While the French right flank has only ~23,000 infantry and 98 guns (assuming the French VI Corps is still marching to the right), facing roughly 40,000 Prussian infantry backed by 72 guns, the breakthrough is highly unlikely. Furthermore, both French IV and VI corps are lacking light infantry, with only one a few light regiments present with the ranks of the two corps.

At the same time, the French force allocated for the main attack on the Prussian right lacks cavalry advantage with only ~6500 French cavalrymen vs ~6,200 Prussian horsemen allocated into this sector.

Additionally, the French Guard’s maneuver toward the far left is a time-consuming operation—especially for the Guard's artillery. It is estimated that the artillery will require at least 12 turns to arrive and deploy, leaving only about 12-14 turns of effective bombardment time against Prussian positions. This significantly reduces the impact of the formidable Guard artillery, effectively cutting its battlefield value in half.

Revised Prussian Battle Plan (from Turn 5 onward)

To counter the above, the following orders are issued:

• Sector 1: The entire II Corps is to be redeployed north of Brye, reinforced by five artillery batteries from the I Corps, three batteries from the III Corps, and 2,500 cavalry from I Corps. The French Guard is not expected to arrive in this sector before Turn 9–10, so II Corps is to attack toward Wagnelee as planned and attempt to defeat the French forces ahead (estimated as two infantry and one cavalry division).
• Any IV Corps elements that arrive are to move toward the centre and be ready to support II Corps or act as a general reserve.
• Sector 2: I Corps is to hold the line from St. Amand to Ligny and, if possible, press the French III Corps to force the French Guard to reinforce French III Corps at St. Amand and hence disrupt its march further north.
• Sector 3: III Corps is to hold a wide front from Ligny to Tongrinne and adopt a defensive posture.

(The image shows the expected balance of forces at each sector after reinforcements' arrival, and based on the intelligence estimates as of turn 5. As can be seen, the majority of the Prussian artillery is allocated to the sector held by the II Corps: 144 Guns in total.

Deep diving into the sectors and establishing a local defensive plan:

Defensive plan for the I Corps tasked with holding the line in the centre from St Amand to Lign

Two positions were identified: Forward line (marked in orange) and Main Defensive line (marked in yellow)

1. The forward line was to be established with the objective of delaying the French advance for as long as possible, turning the battle into a meat grinder within the village of St. Amand and the town of Ligny. This form of engagement suited the Prussians, whose numerous skirmishers and infantry were expected to outmatch the opposing French III and IV Corps in both light troops and overall infantry numbers.

2. The artillery was to be positioned behind the forward line, providing long-range fire support to sustain its defence.

3. The main defensive line was to be established further to the rear, securing key VPs, with both flanks anchored on the obstructed terrain of St. Amand-la-Haye and the town of Ligny.

4. The centre of this line was to be held by infantry squares occupying a reverse-slope position, outside of the French artillery line of sight.

5. A grand battery was to be set up on the elevated ground behind this reverse slope, offering an excellent line of sight and commanding firepower, being protected by squares at the reverse slope position and meeting any approaching enemy forces with canister.

The overall intent of this deployment was to disrupt the momentum of the French advance, compelling them to bring up artillery to support their assault on the forward line. Once the pressure would be too much to bear, the Prussians would fall back to the main defensive line, forcing the French to once again relocate their artillery. The hope was that, by the time this repositioning was complete, the French would have insufficient time left to properly engage the final Prussian position.

The difficult part of the plan was to reposition to the main line in good order while being assaulted by the enemy.

Defensive plan for the II Corps, tasked with holding the right flank at Wagnelee and further north

Likewise, two positions were identified: Forward line (marked in orange) and Main Defensive line (marked in yellow)

1. The II Corps was to advance with one of its brigades and to seize the village of Wagnelée, establishing the forward line on the Corps’ left flank. Occupying the village would deny the French the ability to deploy cavalry on the open plains to its east. Simultaneously, one infantry brigade was tasked with securing the Corps’ right flank, anchoring it on the obstructed terrain further to the north. Two remaining brigades and the Corps cavalry were to remain in reserve.

2. Artillery was to be positioned behind the forward line to provide fire support to the forward line.

3. The main defensive line was to be established further to the rear, across the open ground, and on some reverse slope positions where possible, securing key VPs. The yet-to-arrive elements of the IV Prussian Corps were expected to form a dense infantry formation, deploying battalions of 700+ men in continuous line, with stacks reinforced by skirmishers—creating a wall of lead for any French cavalry attempting a breakthrough. To add depth, infantry brigades were to be arranged in two successive lines, spaced by three hexes. This would enable concentrated fire upon any French cavalry that managed to break through the first line. Prussian cavalry was to be held in a third line as a mobile reserve. The intended frontage of the main defensive line was estimated at approximately 20-25 hexes. Combined, the II Corps and the incoming IV Corps were judged to possess sufficient manpower to establish a densely layered, three-line deep defence along this front.

4. Several artillery positions were identified behind the main line, with the capacity to accommodate approximately 120–140 guns, forming a powerful supporting fire base.

At the operational level, it was critical to establish the forward line and to secure the village of Wagnelee. Buying the operational depth needed to establish the Main line and to buy time for the IV Corps to arrive.

Ligny sector: animated sequence preview covering Turns 6–17. Playback loops automatically but can be paused at any point.

The Prussian right flank: Turns 6 to 16

As planned, on turn 6, the II Prussian Corps began to assault Wagnelee Village (worth 50 VPs), with the aim of defeating the 7th French Infantry Division. Before French guards can arrive on turn 9-10. However, the preparation and deployment for the attack took longer than expected. Firstly, the formed battalions had to go into extended line, and secondly, the enemy forward screen made of skirmishes had to be disordered by friendly skirmishes before the main assault could commence.

Regrettably, I neglected the opportunity to outflank the left flank of the French position with significant force. The enemy left Flank. It was only covered by a few skirmish companies. The Prussian Landwehr Cavalry managed to cut down two companies of these, and Prussian skirmishes could break into the village itself, capturing the command post of the French brigade commander, which had no escort (a reminder to always stack leaders with your units).Alas I lacked formed Infantry on my right flank which could exploit the breakthrough to outflank and trap some of the enemy units with ZOC. On the following turns (turn 9+), French Guard units began to arrive in support:

Anyhow, this was sufficient for the French 7th Division to feel threatened on their left flank and to abandon their position, falling back to the western side of the village. At this point, elements of the French Imperial Guard began to arrive. The Young Guard was immediately committed to a counterattack, supported by the regrouped battalions of the 7th Infantry Division.

With artillery support, the Young Guard managed to rout the right flank of the Prussian brigade north of the village, and a prolonged firefight ensued within the village itself, with village hexes changing hands multiple times.

Further north, light cavalry from the French Imperial Guard arrived from the Quatre Bras sector and attempted to envelop the Prussian flank north of Wagnelee village. Anticipating this move, I deployed one regiment of the 5th Infantry Brigade of II Corps into half-battalion squares, supported by two artillery batteries, to block the French Guard cavalry.

Fortunately, the French cavalry was not supported by infantry or even a single horse battery. I was able to halt both of their advances with concentrated artillery fire, while my infantry half battalion squares, effectively covered a wide front using their zone of control (ZOC). By Turn 16, the Guard cavalry withdrew under artillery fire after losing nearly 100 horsemen.

Had this effort been supported by a couple of horse batteries, the outcome might have been very different—as the Prussian line here was held by half battalion squares formed from Landwehr half-battalions (quality E), which would have been easily routed by French horse artillery.

The Prussian centre: Turns 6 to 15:

Further south, at St. Amand, elements of the French VI Corps began arriving, advancing toward the southern edge of the village and threatening the left flank of the Prussian 2nd Infantry Brigade defending the village. Also, the French commander skilfully established a Grand Battery of ~100 guns south-east of St. Amand to fire enfilade on the Prussian battalions defending the village:

The second French attack on St. Amand began on Turn 10, with forces from the French III Corps repeating the same frontal assault they had attempted two hours earlier. However, this time they were supported by the newly arrived VI Corps, giving the French the advantage of converging from multiple directions and supported by effective artillery fire.

Despite several bayonet counterattacks by the Prussian Landwehr, the French continued advancing into the village, pressing forward despite losses inflicted by Prussian skirmishers.

To relieve pressure from relentless French artillery fire, Prussian cavalry was ordered to launch a counterattack on Turn 14, charging across the stream, breaking through the French skirmish line, and eliminating two French batteries that had caused the most damage to my defensive positions.

On the following turn (15), in a desperate effort to hold the line, I concentrated three regiments of Prussian Landwehr and led them in a bayonet counterattack within the village.

The French III Corps, supported by a Young Guard brigade, had several battalions routed but responded with its own large-scale bayonet counterattack, resulting in heavy losses on both sides. As a result, the Prussian Landwehr involved in this action was either disordered or largely routed, causing disruption to much of the second Prussian line.

At this stage, the Prussian infantry defending this sector—about three infantry brigades—was in poor condition and needed time to reorganise and to regain composure. Most of the light infantry was either disordered, fatigued, or routed, and both the Landwehr and parts of the line infantry had been disordered by earlier fighting or bombardment from the French Guard battery. By Turn 16, I was forced to give up my forward position in this sector and begin retreating to the main defensive line behind St. Amand.

My initial objective in this sector was to turn the battle into a meat grinder for the French infantry and wear them down, buying time so the French run out of time to redeploy for a well-organized assault on my main defensive line. I believe both of these goals were achieved, with approximately 4,500 French casualties compared to ~3,000 Prussian losses. I estimated that elements of the French III Corps involved in the two attacks on St Amand were in a bad shape by now. However, the newly arrived French VI Corps was relatively fresh and suffered few losses in the fighting for the village.

St. Amand was intended as a forward position and was held for around four hours (16+ turns), longer than initially anticipated. This delay allowed me to defer the withdrawal to the main defensive line, limiting the time available for the French grand battery to reposition and regain a prolonged line of sight on my main defensive line. By Turn 18, St. Amand was abandoned, and the redeployment of the French grand battery was expected to take 4–5 turns, with new firing positions likely established by Turn 23—leaving the French only 3–4 turns of effective fire before visibility sharply drops to 4 hexes at Turn 27.

The active defence of the village also had a positive effect on relieving pressure from my right flank—where the main French assault was expected—as the French commander had to reassign some forces into the St. Amand sector, including Guard heavy cavalry, a Young Guard brigade, and several Old Guard batteries.

Analysis of the French Second Assault on St. Amand

Operationally, the French commander correctly identified the weak point of the Prussian position at St. Amand—spotting the vulnerability along the Prussian position, south of St. Amand, and diverting VI Corps into the area. However, a grand battery south of St Amand could have been established from the start of the battle, firing enfilade on the defenders and yielding quicker results. Some of the Old Guard batteries should have been assigned to this sector right at the start, instead of marching them to the far left flank.

Tactically, the French used columns to assault the first Prussian defensive line in the village, which was held by skirmishers. While this allowed the French to advance and drive off the skirmishers with bayonets, it came at a cost. Prussian skirmishers fired from cover inside the village, adding to French fatigue and casualties, especially as the attacking units were already somewhat worn from the earlier failed attack.

A less costly option would have been to send in French skirmishers first to melee and disorder the Prussian skirmishers. Once disrupted, assault columns could then follow up with bayonet charges to drive them out with reduced resistance. However, it is also true that the French III Corps tasked with capturing St Amand lacked light infantry to overcome allied skirmishes.

IV Bulow’s arrival and overall disposition as of turn 16

By Turn 16, the leading Prussian brigade from Bulow’s IV Corps (~6,500 strong) had reached the town of Sombreffe in the Prussian rear, behind the Prussian left. Another infantry brigade (~7,300 men) was approximately one hour away from the positions held by the Prussian III Corps.

Bülow’s cavalry (~3,500 strong) also finally arrived on the map after 14 consecutive failed arrival rolls (with a 5% base chance increasing by 1% each turn), and was about 1.5 hours (6 turns) march from the Prussian left flank. It was followed by another of Bülow’s infantry brigades, roughly three hours (12 turns) away, and unlikely to take part in the action.

Based on the unfolding battle, it became clear that no enemy offensive was planned against the Prussian left flank held by the III Corps. Instead, the main French effort was concentrated against the Prussian right and the centre at St. Amand.

With most of Bülow’s force now arriving, I was now comfortable repositioning the following elements of the III Corps to the center: the 9th and 12th infantry brigades, two additional artillery batteries (in addition to the three already dispatched earlier in the day), and the bulk of the III Corps cavalry brigade (~1,500 sabers), leaving only one cavalry regiment to cover the left flank.

The infantry of the French I Corps is already spotted marching toward the French left, with its leading infantry elements already in LOS and with its light cavalry already arrived in the Wagnelee sector by Turn 14.

Quatre Bras Sector

Following the initial failed French attempt to approach the crossroads, no major events occurred in this sector between Turns 6 and 18. The line stabilized along the stream, with French infantry withdrawing from the south bank under sustained Allied artillery fire.

British reinforcements continued to arrive, and both sides engaged in prolonged artillery exchanges for over three hours with limited effect.

Geminacourt Château, garrisoned by one company of the 5e Dutch Militia and one company of Nassau skirmishers, withstood five or six French assaults before finally falling into French hands.

The French made no attempt to advance through the Bois de Bossu and appeared to have assumed a defensive posture in this sector. The French III Cavalry Corps repositioned to the French right flank but remained stationary. In total, approximately 5,500 French cavalry were tied down in this area with limited opportunity for offensive action.

Current Allied Dispositions and Intentions:

1. The British 5th Infantry Division has crossed the stream and now occupies the village of Thyle.

2. Brunswick cavalry (~1,000 sabers) is maneuvering to cross the stream out of enemy sight to provide cavalry support on the Allied left flank.

With around 5,500 French cavalry present in this sector versus approximately 2,000 Allied sabres, I do not see any large-scale offensive opportunity at the Quatre Bras sector. However, I am considering a limited tactical offensive at the French center, near Gémioncourt, where the terrain may negate the French cavalry advantage. This action will be timed with the arrival and concentration of the 3rd Infantry Division, expected within the hour, along with twelve 9-pounder batteries.

Total losses by the end of Turn 16:

On turn 17, the Prussian St Amand was lost, and the Prussians began withdrawing to the main defensive line. This took place under continuous French artillery fire:

Relocating to the next defensive line took four turns, under cover from the Prussian infantry half-battalion squares forming a continuous ZOC front. By turn 21 the redeployment to the main defensive line was completed as per the initial plan:

The grand battery was established at the designated position, while the bulk of the infantry occupied reverse slope positions, staying out of the enemy artillery’s LOS. Meanwhile, the front line of Prussian squares held firm under fire from swarms of French skirmishers.

By Turn 22, the French were running short of time. They launched a final effort: swarms of skirmishers pressed my new front with assault columns following behind, while a simultaneous assault was mounted at Ligny. From their freshly-deployed gun line, the Prussian batteries having the commanding LOS began to bombard the advancing French columns, and Prussian lancers were ordered to charge the advancing enemy infantry emerging from the reverse slope position:

Nearly five hundred French skirmishers were cut down; a horse battery was overrun; several assault columns were defeated; and one divisional commander was taken prisoner.

At the same moment, I counter-attacked at both Ligny and St Amand-la-Haye, hoping to create several crisis points along the enemy line:

Dense Prussian columns—some 1,600–1,800 bayonets apiece—then bayonet-charged through St Amand and Ligny, throwing the French into confusion, though a handful of their battalions held with admirable resolution.

To burden the French headquarters with information overload and lots of decisions to be made, I ordered a full-scale offensive at Quatre-Bras, with British infantry advancing in mixed order.

It was turn 23, with only four turns remaining until dusk, with no time for the French to organize another combing arms offensive on the Prussian defensive line at St Amand-Ligny sector.

Furthermore, on the Prussian right flank, Bulow’s IV began to arrive, taking defensive positions behind the II Corps:

There was limited time remaining for the French to break through this force despite the favourable terrain.

A ceasefire was called with Minor French defeat on the clock.

The final losses:

7. After Action Analysis

One key factor that shapes my decisions is how I assess my opponent’s style of play. Some players tend to play cautiously, avoiding risk—against them, I can act boldly and take calculated chances. Others are bolder, taking strategic risks that either succeed spectacularly or collapse badly, allowing me to lure them into ambushes or outmaneuver them with surprising flanking attack. That’s why it’s always interesting to face new opponents whose tendencies are still unknown.

In this case, the French commander proved to be reasonably cautious. This became evident from several decisions:

1. He halted his attack at Quatre Bras in the opening hours of the battle once the casualty ratio and ground losses became too unfavorable. Some players would stubbornly follow the initial plan, despite the changing situation.

2. He ended his initial push on St. Amand, choosing not to push his infantry beyond safe limits.

3. He offered a ceasefire instead of assaulting the newly formed Prussian defensive line between St. Amand and Ligny—a new Prussian reverse slope position supported by a 70-gun grand battery with commanding LOS on a narrow front and with cavalry deployed for a counterattack. Assaulting such a line late in the day, with limited artillery support, would likely have risked the collapse of the French centre.

The key flaw in the French battle plan has eventually materialised: the flank march of the Old Guard, with its formidable artillery, took too long. By the time they reached the left, Prussian II Corps had already established a forward position at Wagnelee. Though the village was eventually lost, it provided depth for the Prussian defence and bought the Prussians enough time to absorb the French pressure, which came too late in the day: while the French achieved firepower superiority in this sector by turn 16, it happened too late in the day. The Prussians had enough space to retreat without giving up key objectives, and allowing for limited time for French artillery to be redeployed in support of the final assault.

Tactically, and surprisingly, the Old Guard infantry was never committed at Wagnelee (aside from minor skirmishes). The firefight within the village lasted for 4 hours with neither side gaining any advantage. The deployment of the Old Guard may have made a real difference in that sector. It later became apparent that, due to the fog of war, my opponent had overestimated the Prussian presence in the area and was therefore reluctant to commit the Old Guard against what he perceived to be unfavourable odds.

The appearance of the French Light Guard cavalry on the Prussian right was neutralised for hours by two Landwehr regiments formed in half-battalion squares and supported by two artillery batteries. Without infantry or artillery support, the French cavalry could do little and spent hours under Prussian bombardment. It was, in effect, a wasted thrust.

In the post-battle discussion, it became clear that this move was intended as a feint rather than a genuine breakthrough attempt. Still, in my view, it was unequal resource allocation — 2,000 elite A++ cavalry effectively dead-blocked by a single Landwehr regiment (~2,400 strong) and two Prussian batteries, which alone inflicted close to 150 casualties among the guard troopers.

Bottom line: the Prussian army fought a disciplined war of attrition at the planned forward positions at St. Amand and Wagnelee, effectively denying open ground for massed French cavalry across the entire front—Quatre Bras, St. Amand, Ligny, and Wagnelee.

The French artillery, particularly the Guard batteries, might have made a greater impact had they been pushed forward earlier—specifically into the St. Amand sector—rather than spending most of the battle marching toward the Prussian right, arriving too late to influence the outcome.

Ultimately, the key to success in this battle — as in many others — lies in allocating the right force mix in relation to terrain and the strengths of each army. The French, with their dominant cavalry arm, have to exploit open terrain opportunities at both Ligny and Quatre-Bras to maximize the impact of their mounted troops. On the other side, the burden on the Prussians and British is to deny that freedom of operational maneuver to the French cavalry at all costs. In the final phase, the French did manage to deploy several cavalry divisions, forcing the Prussians to form square and taking some losses from French artillery. However, this came far too late. By then, the time was running out, and the Prussians had ample reserves available to rotate out routed or depleted battalions.

Tactically, whenever the French managed to synchronize their cavalry, infantry, and artillery into coordinated combined-arms pressure, the pressure became unsustainable for the Prussians. They were forced to endure prolonged artillery bombardments in square formations or abandon positions altogether. A good example of this came after the second French assault on Saint-Amand, when the French cuirassier corps successfully crossed the stream and the French VI Corps turned the flank — forcing a Prussian withdrawal from Saint-Amand under mounting combined-arms pressure.

At this point, the Prussian centre was vulnerable: artillery batteries had yet to complete their redeployment and were still not unlimbered on their designated positions along the main defensive line, while the infantry was retreating either in disarray or in densely packed formations, with units crowding each other and vulnerable to routing and disorder.

This was the moment to abandon caution — the Prussian squares covering the retreat could have been broken by a decisive bayonet charge from French assault columns, while the French IV Cavalry Corps should have been thrown forward.

While this vulnerability was obvious to the Prussian side, the French commander may have had only a limited grasp of the situation due to the fog of war and the poor visibility caused by the reverse slope masking the Prussian retreat. That uncertainty led to hesitation — and with it, a missed opportunity to break the Prussian line before reserves could stabilize the sector.

That concludes todays post. If you would like to discuss it with others head on over to the Napoleonic Battles section of our forum.