Game of the Week, October 5-11

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 damaged the American battle fleet but did not catch its carriers in port. Japanese forces then advanced through Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. The carrier force that struck Pearl Harbor supported this offensive. American carriers remained valuable because they could strike at sea without waiting for the battleships to be restored.

Aircraft could scout hundreds of miles, yet weather, mistaken identifications, and delayed reports made a contact perishable. At Coral Sea in May 1942, Japanese and Allied fleets fought through aircraft while the opposing ships remained out of sight of one another. Japan sank Lexington and damaged Yorktown, but its move against Port Moresby was checked. Shōkaku was damaged and Zuikaku had lost many aircraft and aircrew; neither would join the operation against Midway.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto sought a battle that would eliminate the American carriers. The Japanese plan combined an attack and landing at Midway with a separate operation in the Aleutians. Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s four carriers would strike the atoll, an invasion force would follow, and Yamamoto’s main body remained farther back. The plan counted on drawing the American fleet into battle. It also required these forces to support one another over enormous distances.

At Station Hypo in Pearl Harbor, Joseph Rochefort’s team took “AF,” the Japanese code name for a target, to mean Midway. U.S. accounts describe a false Midway broadcast about a broken water plant. A Japanese intelligence report relayed the supposed shortage; on 22 May, Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne published this English translation:

“Refer this unit’s report dated 19th, at the present time we have only enough water for two weeks. Please supply us immediately.”

— Japanese intelligence report on Midway’s water supply,
translated by Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne, 22 May 1942

Admiral Chester Nimitz reinforced the atoll and sent Enterprise and Hornet, under Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, to wait northeast of it. Yorktown, repaired rapidly after Coral Sea, joined them under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Radio intelligence narrowed the attack date, but could not reveal every Japanese ship’s position.

On 3 June American patrol aircraft spotted the Japanese invasion force. Before dawn on 4 June, Nagumo launched aircraft against Midway. The island’s defenders struck back with land-based bombers, but the Japanese carriers survived. Nagumo’s strike leader called for another attack on the island; a scout then reported American ships nearby. Preparing aircraft for different targets took time, and the carriers had to recover planes while defending themselves. Nagumo ordered:

「敵機動部隊ヲ捕捉撃滅セントス」

“We intend to locate and destroy the enemy task force.”

— Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, First Air Fleet order, 5 June 1942 (Japanese time; 4 June at Midway)

The American carriers launched their own strikes before their crews had a complete picture of the enemy’s position. Squadrons became separated in flight, and some searched empty sea. Torpedo bombers found the Japanese carriers and attacked against fierce fighter and antiaircraft opposition, suffering devastating losses. Their attacks did not score the decisive hits. In the late morning, dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown arrived and fatally damaged Akagi, Kaga, and Sōryū within minutes. The Americans succeeded through timely launch and determined search, not a perfectly coordinated strike.

One Japanese carrier, Hiryū, remained in action. Its aircraft struck Yorktown twice, first with bombs and then with torpedoes. American crews restored the carrier to operation after the first attack, but the second forced her abandonment. Later that day, aircraft from Enterprise found and mortally damaged Hiryū. Yamamoto cancelled the invasion. American aircraft pursued the withdrawing Japanese force on 5 and 6 June, sinking the cruiser Mikuma. A Japanese submarine torpedoed Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann during salvage efforts; Yorktown sank on 7 June.

Midway removed four Japanese fleet carriers and ended the attempt to seize the atoll. It did not finish the Pacific War. In August, American landings on Guadalcanal opened a struggle in which carriers again screened troop movements and attacked the opposing fleet. At the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands, searches, aircraft losses, damaged flight decks, and land-based airfields shaped what each navy could accomplish. The United States lost Hornet at Santa Cruz, even as Japan paid heavily in experienced aircrew.

By June 1944 the balance had changed. As American forces moved into the Marianas, Japanese carriers advanced into the Philippine Sea. American fighters and shipboard defenses destroyed large numbers of attacking aircraft, while American strikes and submarines added to Japanese carrier losses. The fleets still fought through scouting reports and long-range air strikes, but their air groups were no longer evenly matched.

Across these battles, the operational problem remains recognizable even as the balance of power changes. A commander needs enough information to launch effectively but rarely has enough time to wait for certainty. Aircraft committed to attack cannot defend the fleet at the same moment; carriers protected too cautiously may surrender the initiative. Midway lets players revisit the decisions that made Pacific carrier battles so dangerous: where to place the fleet, which contact to trust, and when to send the planes.